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  Dominos in the dairy: An analysis of transgenic maize in Dutch dairy farming 
 
Abstract 
Isolation distances to limit the risk of cross-pollination from transgenic to non-
transgenic crops can severely limit the potential use of transgenic crops through a so-
called 'domino effect' where a field of non-transgenic crops limits adoption of 
transgenic crops not only on plots in its direct vicinity, but also in plots further away 
as its neighbors are forced to grow the non-transgenic varieties, forcing their 
neighbors to grow the non-transgenic variety, and so on. The extent to which this 
effect takes place, however, may depend crucially on the type of farm. For example, 
dairy farms can use grassland as a buffer between transgenic and conventional maize 
plots. 
This article assesses the effects of isolation distances for transgenic maize in 
dairy farming. A spatially explicit farm model is applied to a region in the Southern 
Netherlands to identify to what extent a single farmer (who uses non-transgenic 
maize) can limit other farmers’ potential to grow transgenic maize. The main findings 
are that 50% or more of the farms in the study area will not affect the potential 
adoption of transgenic maize by growing conventional maize at all. This result even 
holds under distance measures of 800m, which is the largest distance implemented by 
member states of the European Union. When they do have such effects, isolation 
distances can reduce the benefits from transgenic maize by €5,000 - €6,000, for a 
considerable part through a domino effect. Large net benefits of transgenic maize may 
limit the spatial effects as farmers are more willing to relocate maize production to 
areas where transgenic maize is allowed. 
  1  Introduction 
Transgenic introduction of herbicide tolerance in agricultural crops has the potential 
to drastically reduce herbicide use in crops such as maize, oil seed rape, sugar beet, 
and cotton (Phipps and Park, 2002). Concerns over cross-pollination by transgenic of 
non-transgenic crops, however, have led to coexistence measures including isolation 
distances between transgenic and non-transgenic crops (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009). EU member states, for instance, require farmers to maintain a 
distance between conventional and transgenic maize plots that varies from 15 meters 
in Sweden to 800 meters in Luxembourg. 
Previous studies (Demont et al., 2008) warn that such isolation distances may 
lead to a so-called 'domino effect'. This effect occurs when one farmer plants the non-
transgenic variety of a crop, thereby forcing his or her neighbors to also grow the non-
transgenic variety, even if they would prefer the transgenic variety. In turn, their non-
transgenic crops force their neighbors to grow non-transgenic crops, and so on. 
Demont et al. (2008) demonstrate this effect for oilseed rape in Central France, and 
show that if initially 50% of the study area is intended to be used for producing 
transgenic oilseed rape, distance requirements of 100 meters (which is common in the 
European Union) can reduce this by 38% of the cover area, 5% of which can be 
attributed to the domino effect. The domino effect’s part may seem minor in the entire 
reduction of transgenic oilseed rape area, but it causes about a third of the eventual 
costs of coexistence measures. 
The direct and indirect effects of minimum distance requirements may depend 
crucially on whether the crop is used by arable farms or livestock farms. When an 
arable farmer wishes to grow a transgenic crop on a given plot, but the presence of a 
plot with a non-transgenic variety prevents him or her from doing so, the next best 
alternative is likely to also grow the non-transgenic variety, not another crop 
altogether. Livestock farms, however, typically produce a mixture of grass and fodder 
crops. In landscapes dominated by livestock farms, smart spatial planning of grass and 
maize production may avoid coexistence conflicts between transgenic and non-
transgenic crops such as maize and fodder beet. 
To understand the intuition behind this possibility, consider the configuration depicted 
in    Table 1. In this example there are three farms with two plots each, one of which 
is located close to the farm and another further away. For the sake of argument, 
assume that farmers need to produce grass on one plot, and maize on another. They 
prefer to produce grass on the plot located near the farm, and to produce maize on the 
other plot which is further away from the farm. This is a plausible assumption because 
grassland is harvested more frequently than maize, and when grassland is grazed by 
dairy cows farmers need to move the cows between the plot and the milking barn. 
Lastly, assume that the isolation distance in place prohibits growing transgenic maize 
on plots adjacent to plots where non-transgenic maize is grown. 
 
  Table 1: Example configuration of three farms with two plots each 
Farmer Near  Far  from  farms 
A 1  2 
B 3  4 
C 5  6 
 
Suppose farmer A prefers non-transgenic maize over transgenic maize, and this maize 
will be produced on plot 2. This means that farmer B cannot grow transgenic maize 
on his or her preferred plot 4. This leaves farmer B two options: either grow non-
transgenic maize on plot 4, or grow grass on plot 4 and transgenic maize on plot 3. 
The first option will also affect farmer C’s ability to grow transgenic maize, and 
hence create a domino effect. Note, however, that the second option will not create a 
domino effect because in that case farmer C can still grow transgenic maize on either 
plot 5 or 6. Another important observation is that farmer B is more likely to grow 
transgenic maize on plot 3 if the benefits from adopting transgenic maize outweigh 
the costs from allocating maize production to a plot that would have been the 
preferred plot for grassland. This implies that a domino effect is less likely when 
transgenic maize is more profitable compared to conventional maize. 
This article analyzes to what extent isolation distances may limit dairy farms’ 
adoption of transgenic fodder crops, taking explicitly into account their ability to 
allocate fodder production in a way that allows them to grow transgenic varieties 
despite the presence of a dairy farmer who does not do so. More specifically, it seeks 
to address the question to what extent a single dairy farmer can prevent other dairy 
farmers from adopting transgenic fodder crops, what proportion of that effect should 
be attributed to a domino effect, and how these effects depend on the cost difference 
between transgenic and non-transgenic fodder crops. The transgenic fodder crop 
considered in the paper is herbicide-tolerant maize. 
The research questions are addressed with a spatially explicit dairy farming 
model that simulates land use decisions of 213 dairy farms in a region in the province 
of Noord-Brabant, the Netherlands. The model includes the fodder demand of dairy 
cows as well as the farm’s production, purchase, and sale of grass, maize, and 
concentrates. Similarly to Demont et al. (2008), the model simulates farmers’ land use 
decisions in a number of iterations, where after each iteration spatial conflicts 
between transgenic and non-transgenic maize are identified and resolved in the next 
iteration. 
2  Model and data 
2.1  Introduction 
The model used in this paper is a spatially explicit farm management model based on 
farm management models developed by Berentsen and Giesen (1995), with additional 
insights from Nijssen and van Scheppingen (1995) and (Groeneveld et al., 2005), and 
updated for price levels of 2008 (ASG, 2008). 2.2  Model structure 
For each dairy farm f in the study area the model maximizes the gross margin, defined 
as the difference between revenues and specific costs. This definition of gross margin 
excludes fixed costs that are exogenous to the decision to adopt transgenic maize, 
such as maintenance and depreciation of buildings. The objective function of the 
model for a given farm f, given the choices of all other farms, is therefore: 
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where If denotes the gross margin of farm f, rc denotes net revenues per dairy cow; Kf 
denotes the number of dairy cows on farm f; τv denotes the sales price of fodder type 
v; Tvf denotes the sales of fodder type v; Of denotes the set of plots p used by farm f; Q 
denotes the set of fodder types produced by dairy farms; ovp denotes the costs of 
producing fodder type v on plot p; Avp denotes the area of fodder type v on plot p; pv 
denotes the purchase price of fodder type v; and Pfv denotes the purchases of fodder 
type v. The model includes three fodder types, namely grass, maize, and concentrates. 
Each farm is assumed to maximize its gross margin under restrictions regarding 
the cattle's fodder requirements, available land, and possible restrictions on 
production of GM maize. The cattle's fodder ration must supply sufficient energy, 
protein, and fiber. Moreover, the rumen degraded protein balance must at least be 
positive. These requirements are included in the following equation: 
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where niv denotes the nutritional value of fodder type v with regard to criterion i; Sfsv 
denotes the supply on farm f in season s of fodder type v; fis denotes the demand on 
farm f for fodder nutritional element i in season s. There is a limit to how much fodder 
a cow can digest, included through the following equation: 
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where ζv denotes the satiety value of fodder type (v); and ψs denotes the fodder intake 
capacity per cow in season s. Fodder production is defined by 
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where Of denotes the set of plots used by farm f; Qfv denotes production on farm f of 
fodder type v; dv denotes production of fodder type v; and Q denotes the set of fodder 
types produced on dairy farms. Differences between production and supply must be 
resolved by either purchases or sales of fodder: 
v f Q S T P fv
s
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 where Pfv denotes the purchases by farm f of fodder type v; Tfv denotes the sales by 
farm f of fodder type v. Only concentrates and maize can be traded; purchases and 
sales of grass are fixed at zero. The land area on a given plot p devoted to fodder type 
v is restricted by the size of p: 
p a A p
v




Considerations of coexistence between transgenic and non-transgenic maize are 
included as follows. Let X denote the set of transgenic fodder types, in this case 
transgenic maize, and Y the set of their non-transgenic counterparts. Moreover, 
assume that any given plot must be designated either a plot for the transgenic variety, 
a plot for the non-transgenic variety, or a plot for another crop altogether. Denote 
these designations by the index l, and let Llp be a binary variable denoting whether 
plot p is used for land designation type l. Then whenever a fodder type is a member of 
X or Y, its production in a given plot is restricted by whether that plot has the right 
designation: 










where Vl denotes the set of fodder types associated with land designation type l; and. 
Land designation types are mutually exclusive: 
p L
l
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When considering isolation distances between plots it is important to distinguish two 
situations: one where both plots involved are used by the same farm, and one where 
one plot is used by one farmer and the other plot by another. In the first case, the 
decision on land cover lies with one and the same person, who faces the following 
restriction: 
p f f p l lp p p p l l L L N O O Y X              , , , , 1 , (9) 
 
where Np denotes the set of plots p' within a distance from plot p equal to or smaller 
than the isolation distance. When plot p is owned by farmer f, and plot p' is owned by 
another farmer, the land cover type of p' is exogenous to f's decision: 
p f f p l lp p p p l l L N O O Y X              , , , , 1  , (10) 
 
where l'p' is a binary parameter denoting whether plot p' is used for land use type l'. 
2.3  Data 
The study area lies in the province of North-Brabant, the Netherlands (Figure 1). The 
dataset used in this study was originally developed for a land reallotment scheme 
(Schmitz, 1996). This dataset describes a sufficiently realistic situation to analyze to 
analyze farmers’ land use decisions under different spatial coexistence rules. About 36% of the 377 farms in the study area have dairy cows, with an average of 46 head 
of dairy cattle per farm (Schmitz, 1996). Other agricultural activities in the area 
include beef cattle farming, arboriculture and arable farming. 
 
 
Figure 1: Plots included as dairy plots in the model 
 
Schmitz (1996) classifies the farms in De Leijen according to the fraction of farm size 
equivalents devoted to several agricultural activities. In this system, the fraction of 
agricultural activities in the total farm size determines the type of farm. This 
classification yields classes of farms with, for instance, 60-80% of farm size 
equivalents devoted to arable farming, 20-40% devoted to horticulture and less than 
20% devoted to other, agricultural activities. For this study farms are selected with 
more than half the farm size equivalents devoted to cattle farming, and with more than 
20 dairy cows. This selection includes 213 farms, together using 1235 plots with a 
total area of 4746 ha. Average farm size is 22.3  9.1 ha (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Farm size distribution in the study area 
 
Data on market prices of fodder, fertilizer, hired labor and other farm inputs come 
from ASG (2008). Maize production costs about €1261 per ha, €35 of which is spent 


















ffarm come from de Jong (2006). Lastly, data on feed quality of conventional grass 
and maize are taken from CVB (2008). 
Demarcation of the study area always raises the question what to assume with 
respect to the plots at its fringe. Moreover, some farms in the database own plots 
within as well as outside the study area. We assume that plots outside the study area, 
but not used by the farms in the database, are not used at all for maize production. 
Farms in the database are allowed to allocate maize production to plots outside the 
study area if they own such plots. We assume that these plots cannot be used for 
transgenic maize, but that they are sufficiently far from the study area to avoid 
coexistence problems. 
2.4  Modeling procedure 
The spatial externalities between farmers require that the model be run in a series of 
phases. The first phase maximizes the sum of farm profits (If) with λlp = 0 for all land 
use types, assuming that one of the 213 farms considered will not grow transgenic 
maize. Hence, the first phase gives the land use allocation if farmers only have to 
mind distances between transgenic and non-transgenic crops on their own farm. 
Under the assumptions made, a given farm will either grow transgenic or non-
transgenic maize, and not both. The exceptions to this rule are farms owning plots 
outside the study area, but these plots are assumed to be sufficiently far away not to 
affect land use decisions in the study area. 
Each phase consists of two model runs. The first model run maximizes the 
profits of each farm. The second run minimizes the area of plots with non-transgenic 
maize that conflict with transgenic maize, under the restriction that the profits of each 
farm are equal to the profits found in the first run. This second run is carried out to 
minimize any influence from the choice of optimization algorithm and starting 
solution. It is very well possible that the same farm income can be generated with 
many different land use allocations. In that case, conflicts between non-transgenic and 
transgenic maize, and hence the estimate of the domino effect, could be an outcome 
not of the farmers' incentive structure, but of the researcher's choice of optimization 
algorithm and starting solution. To reduce this arbitrary element, and to focus our 
analysis on the farmers' financial incentives, we proceed as follows. Let Fp denote 
whether the vicinity of plot p is free of transgenic maize: 
p
l
p l p p p L F N
X
     

 , 1 . (11) 
 
Note that Fp can only be equal to 1 if none of the plots in Np contain transgenic maize. 
Let  Cp denote whether plot p contains non-transgenic maize that conflicts with 
transgenic maize in its vicinity: 
p F L C p
l




One could minimize the number of plots with non-transgenic maize that conflict with 
transgenic maize (i.e. the sum of Cp), under the restriction that the profits of each farm (If) are equal to that in the first run. Note, however, that this procedure gives all plots 
equal weight, so that the results may still depend to some extent on the choice of 
algorithm and starting solution. To minimize this influence further, we do not 
minimize the number of non-transgenic plots that conflict with transgenic plots, but 
their total area, M: 
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where   
∗ denotes the profits of farm f in the first run. This procedure may still leave 
some room for influence by the choice of algorithm and starting solution, but this 
influence will be a lot smaller than if we took the results of the profit maximization 
for granted. Note also that although we minimize the area of non-transgenic plots 
conflicting with transgenic plots, this does not necessarily mean that the model will 
seek to eliminate non-transgenic maize. After all, conflicts between transgenic and 
non-transgenic maize can also be resolved by moving the transgenic variety. 
The first phase gives a value of Llp to which λlp is updated, and the two model 
runs are repeated with this updated value. The result of the second phase gives the 
land use allocation after some farms (notably the neighbors of the farm with non-
transgenic maize) have changed their land use allocation in order to comply with the 
isolation distance. Hence, we can interpret the differences between the first and 
second run as the direct effect of the isolation distance. After the second phase λlp is 
again updated to the value of Llp and the model is run again for the third phase. From 
the third phase on the model traces a possible domino effect through the landscape 
until there are no more plots with transgenic maize within the isolation distance from 
a plot with non-transgenic maize. Hence, we can interpret the difference between the 
second phase’s result and the final result as the domino effect. 
This procedure is repeated for 2556 different combinations of cost difference, 
farm, and isolation distance. Four different levels of cost difference were considered, 
namely €5, €15, €25, and €35. For each of the 213 farms in the study area the model 
was run assuming that this particular farm chooses not to adopt transgenic maize, 
regardless of the cost difference. Lastly, three isolation distances were considered, 
namely 15 meters, 250 meters, and 800 meters, which are applied by Sweden, The 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, respectively (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009). 
3  Results 
3.1  Null scenario 
When no transgenic maize is available, the model predicts that the 213 farms in the 
model generate a total annual gross margin of about € 12.8 mln, with an average of 
€1206  130 per dairy cow. LEI (2010) suggests that farms of the size class found in 
the study area had an average gross margin of €1894 per dairy cow in 2008. This 
rather large difference between predicted and observed gross margin is mainly caused by a difference in revenues. The model predicts average revenues of €2354, whereas 
the observed revenues are €3139 per dairy cow. Predicted costs (€1148) are quite 
close to their observed counterparts (€1245). The costs are much more relevant to our 
analysis than the revenues, because revenues consist mainly of sales of milk and meat, 
whereas the costs depend mainly on the farm's land use decisions. 
The model predicts that out of 213 farms, 123 farms grow maize, 39 of which 
have devoted exactly 30% of their land to maize production. This result is due to 
manure regulations that require farms to have at least 70% grassland to apply for 
looser nitrate restrictions. All in all, about 11.2% of the dairy farming area in the 
model is used as maize land, whereas the average figure according to LEI (2010) is 
14.8%. 
3.2  First phase: potential area and benefits of transgenic maize 
The first phase of the model gives the allocation of transgenic maize that would be 
realized if no isolation distance were imposed (Table 2). Depending on the price 
premium of transgenic maize, the area of transgenic maize could increase to about 
562 ha, with about 81 ha non-transgenic maize, including plots outside the study area. 
 
Table 2: Total area of transgenic maize in the absence of isolation distances under 
four different cost differences between transgenic and non-transgenic maize (average 
and standard deviation over 213 scenarios, in each which another farm abstains from 
growing transgenic maize) 
Cost  difference  5 15 25 35 
Average  491 501 506 548 
Standard  deviation 3.13 3.20 3.20 3.25 
 
Depending on the cost difference between transgenic and non-transgenic maize the 
total benefits of transgenic maize for adopting farmers in the area can be up to 
€ 17,700 per year. Although in    Table 1 the area of transgenic maize takes a sudden leap between a cost difference of 
€30 per ha and €35 per ha, farm profits increase quite linearly with cost difference 
between transgenic and non-transgenic maize: for each €1 decrease in the price of 
transgenic maize total annual farm profits rise by between €473 and €561. 
3.3  Direct effects of minimum distance requirements 
The difference between the first and second iterations give an indication of the direct 
effects of the minimum distance requirements (Table 3). About half or more of the 
farms in the study area can produce non-transgenic maize without imposing any 
restrictions on their neighbors’ production of transgenic maize. Not surprisingly, this 
number declines with the minimum distance to be kept: under a minimum distance of 
15 meters about 150 farms will have no external effects, whereas under a minimum 
distance of 800 meters this holds for about 103 farms.  
 
Table 3: Direct effects of minimum distance requirements under different levels of net 
cost savings (d-m) 
d-m 
Largest income reduction  Largest GM area reduction (ha)  Farms with no effect 
15m 250m 800m  15m  250m  800m  15m 250m 800m 
€5  €145 €224  €389  27 44 73  150  122  103 
€15  €266 €434  €708  24 43 68  150  122  103 
€25  €380 €644 €1,035  22 40 65  149  122  103 
€35  €492 €843 €1,361  22 40 65  149  122  103 
 
Interestingly, the largest reduction found in transgenic maize production area declines 
with the net cost savings for farmers. This suggests that as farmers have more to gain 
from growing transgenic maize, they become more willing to do so on plots where 
they would not have allocated the non-transgenic variety. Forgone profits, however, 
rise fairly evenly with net cost savings. 
3.4  Domino effects of isolation distances 
The changes in farm profits and land use allocation after the second iteration are due 
not to the direct effect of the non-transgenic farm, but to indirect effects, i.e. the 
domino effect (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Domino effects of isolation distances under different levels of net cost 
savings (d-m) 
d-m 
Largest income reduction  Largest GM area reduction (ha) 
Average share in total 
income reduction 
15m 250m 800m  15m 250m  800m  15m  250m 800m 
€5 €285  €560  €1,041  56  111  212  32%  41% 67% 
€15 €514 €1,023  €2,095  50  97  211  21% 37%  67% 
€25 €756 €1,255  €3,149  48  74  211  26% 36%  64% 
€35 €995 €1,612  €4,204  48  72  211  16% 35%  64% 
 Especially for larger distance measures the domino effect can become substantial. For 
those plots that are affected by the minimum distance requirements, the share of the 
direct effect increases with the minimum distance requirements. 
4  Conclusion 
Isolation distances for transgenic crops can seriously limit the potential area of 
transgenic crops. Given the reductions in herbicide use possible with herbicide-
tolerant crops, this effect has environmental as well as purely financial implications. 
Due to the spatial nature of these measures, however, the scale of their implications 
depends heavily on the spatial configuration of plots in an agricultural area. 
This paper demonstrates that the type of farming considered may also matter. 
Dairy farms are characterized by a variety of crops, all of which are necessary for 
cattle feeding. When faced with a ban on transgenic crops on a particular plot, a 
reorganization of their crop production may enable them to adopt the transgenic crop. 
This may come at a price, however, so the transgenic crop must be sufficiently better 
than the non-transgenic variety for them to do so. 
Our analysis suggests that this effect will indeed likely occur. The results show 
that as transgenic maize is cheaper to use than non-transgenic maize, a single dairy 
farmer in a Dutch dairy farming region who declines to grow transgenic maize has a 
smaller effect on his colleagues’ propensity to grow transgenic maize. This can be 
observed for the direct effect of the non-transgenic plots on other farmers, as well 
when the so-called domino effect is taken into account. This effect is not strong 
enough, however, to offset the effect that the benefits forgone because of the isolation 
distances are also larger when transgenic maize is cheaper. 
Overall, these results show that the total costs of isolation distances (defined as 
the benefits from transgenic maize forgone) can be in the order of €5,000 - €6,000 per 
year for the entire study area, or about €25 per year per farm. Although this is not 
large, it is somewhat alarming that a substantial part of these costs are due to the 
indirect, or domino, effect, which is the least observable. Nevertheless, the results also 
show that about half of the dairy farms in the study region can abstain from adopting 
transgenic maize without having negative consequences for other farms. 
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